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NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES

to the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

US DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATING PROPOSAL (U)

1. The enclosed memorandum by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, dated 6 June 1961, together with its attachment, is referred to the Special Assistant for Arms Control for comment and recommendation as a matter of priority.

2. A report is requested by 1600, 8 June 1961.

F. J. BLOUIN

M. J. INGELIDO

Joint Secretariat

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ENCLOSURE

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Washington

6 June 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: US Disarmament Negotiating Proposal (U)

Attached is a draft working paper entitled, "Recommended US Disarmament Negotiating Proposal", which has been prepared by the US Disarmament Administration as an interim product of its work at this stage of preparation for the July 31 disarmament talks.

Mr. John J. McCloy, Adviser to the President on Disarmament, has asked the Department of Defense and other interested departments and agencies to review the draft and submit comments to him by June 15. His plans call for consideration of this matter at a Principals' Meeting at the end of June.

Your formal comments on the draft paper by June 12 would be appreciated.

/s/ ROSWELL GILPATRIC

Deputy

Attachment
As stated above

Draft Working Paper

May 31, 1961

This document consists of 21 pages.
Number _____ of _____ copies, Series A.

RECOMMENDED U. S. DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATING PROPOSAL

I. BASIC CONSIDERATIONS

A. The Goal

The ultimate goal of mankind is a world which is free from the scourge of war and the dangers and burdens of armaments; in which the use of force has been replaced by the rule of law, and international adjustments to a changing world are achieved peacefully; in which peace and security are maintained in accordance with the principles of the U.N. Charter.

B. Disarmament Objectives

As an essential contribution to the ultimate goal, nations should seek agreement on measures to:

1. Eliminate the threat of war through accident, miscalculation, or misinformation.
2. Eliminate the capabilities of nations to launch armed attack against other nations.
3. Eliminate the requirements for nations to divert resources to defense needs.

C. Implementing Principles

1. Disarmament should proceed in such a manner that at no time would its progress adversely affect the security of any state.

2. Disarmament shall proceed through stages containing balanced, phased, and safeguarded measures with each measure being carried out in an agreed period of time under supervision of an international control organization set up within the framework of the United Nations.

3. Compliance with all disarmament obligations must be effectively verified throughout by the control organization to ensure that compliance with these obligations is verified from their entry into force. Such verification should include the capability to ascertain not only that reductions of armed forces and armaments in agreed amounts take place, but also that retained armed forces and armaments do not exceed agreed levels at any stage.

4. Transition from one stage to the next shall take place when the Security Council of the United Nations agrees that all accepted measures in the preceding stage have been fully implemented and their effective verification and inspection is continuing, and that any additional verification arrangements and procedures required for measures in the next stage have been established and are ready to operate effectively.

5. The progress of disarmament should be related to measures to strengthen international institutions for maintaining peace so that as disarmament of national military establishments proceeds nations can rely on effective international institutions for peace and security and justice.

D. Task of the Negotiating States

The task of the negotiating states is to achieve and to implement as rapidly as feasible the widest area of agreement possible on measures directed toward achieving the ultimate goal and to continue their efforts until a full program for achieving the ultimate goal has been developed.

II. THE PROGRAM FOR DISARMAMENT

Based on the foregoing considerations, the following is submitted as an outline program for general disarmament. It is proposed that this program should form the basis for a joint declaration to serve as a guide for the negotiating states.

STAGE I

Stage I provides for measures which can be undertaken promptly and which would promote confidence, lessen the danger of war, and begin the curtailment of national military capabilities:

A. Measures to Reduce the Danger of War by Accident, Miscalculation, and Surprise Attack

1. Arrangements shall be made for advance notification to the control organization of launchings of missiles, space vehicles, or other devices intended to rise above an agreed altitude, together with the location of the launching and the track of the vehicle.

2. Arrangements shall be made for advance notification to the control organization of such major military movements and maneuvers as might give rise to misinterpretation or cause alarm and induce countermeasures. The notification shall include the geographic areas to be used and the nature, scale, and time span of the event.

3. States shall consult with each other regarding the establishment in each other's territory of observer teams, to be on call at the discretion of the host state in the event the host state wishes to give reassurance regarding its military activities and posture.

4. There shall be established control posts at such locations as major ports, railway centers, motor highways, and airbases to report on concentrations of military forces.

5. Such zones of aerial and ground inspection as may be agreed shall be established.

B. Measures to Contain and Reduce
the Nuclear Threat

1. Those states which have not already adhered to the treaty on discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests shall do so.

2. The production of fissionable materials for use in weapons shall be stopped.

(Note: This measure was tied to progress on conventional disarmament in the June 27 paper but not in President Eisenhower's September 22, 1960 U.N. speech. The question of whether such a link should be recommended for consideration in the current U.S. position is still under study.)

3. Following the cessation of production of fissionable materials for use in weapons, agreed quantities of fissionable materials from past production shall be transferred to non-weapons purposes.

4. A Nuclear Experts Commission consisting of representatives of the nuclear powers shall be established (a) to recommend formulae for achieving equitable future reductions of national fissionable materials stockpiles, and (b) to study and determine the possibilities of verifying such future reductions and of eventually eliminating such stockpiles.

5. Any fissionable materials transferred between countries for peaceful uses of nuclear energy shall be subject to IAEA safeguards.

6. The nations possessing nuclear weapons shall each make a declaration that they do not intend to transfer nuclear weapons, materials for production of nuclear weapons, or technology required to produce nuclear weapons to nations not possessing such weapons. Nations not now possessing nuclear weapons shall, for their part, make a declaration that they do not intend to seek or receive such assistance.

7. Such nuclear weapon free areas as may be agreed shall be established

C. Measures to Reduce Strategic Delivery Vehicles

1. All parties shall furnish the control organization complete information on the numbers of their strategic delivery vehicles by agreed categories. The information shall include numbers of vehicles and their location by defined areas, including sea and foreign land based units, but not specific individual vehicle locations within areas.

2. Reduction of strategic delivery vehicles to agreed levels shall be achieved by agreed steps with progressive verification of declared levels and reductions. The reductions shall be accomplished by transfers to internationally supervised depots of vehicles that become excess during each step. Upon the attainment of agreed interim levels during the Stage I reduction process, the vehicles that have been placed under international supervision shall be destroyed, transferred to the United Nations, or converted to peaceful uses.

3. Production of agreed categories of strategic delivery vehicles shall be discontinued.

4. Testing agreed categories of strategic delivery vehicles shall be halted.

5. The placing into orbit or stationing in outer space of weapons capable of producing mass destruction shall be prohibited.

D. Measures for Reduction of Armed Forces
and Other Armaments

1. Complete information on existing numbers of forces, conventional armaments by major category, and military expenditures shall be furnished the control organization within one month after an agreement comes into force.

2. Force levels for the U.S. and U.S.S.R. shall be reduced by agreed steps to 2.1 million each; concurrently, force levels of certain other states shall also be reduced to agreed levels.

3. Major types of armaments, by agreed categories, shall progressively be deposited in internationally supervised depots; the amounts to be deposited during each step within the Stage I reduction process shall be a portion of the difference between the initial levels and the agreed final levels for Stage I and shall be in relationship to the force level reductions for each step. When at the end of the Stage I transfers the parties have agreed that retained armaments and armed forces are at proscribed levels, the armaments in depots shall be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses. While the composition of the final levels of armaments for Stage I need not be identical for each party, they shall be stipulated by each party in an agreed annex to the agreement.

4. Limitation of armaments and armed forces in agreed areas may be negotiated with the agreement of the countries affected.

5. An international study group of qualified experts shall be established for the purpose of seeking the technical bases for the design of inspection systems applicable to the development, manufacture, and stockpiling of CBR armaments.

E. Machinery for Keeping the Peace and for
the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes

1. The parties shall support in the United Nations the creation of a U.N. volunteer peace force, international in character, for use by appropriate organs of the U.N. to help maintain the peace. Members

of this force shall be available to support the control organization in the conduct of its operations.

2. The parties shall promote studies by the U.N., and cooperate in implementation of these studies, so that the U.N. will have available, for later stages of disarmament, a peace force capable of maintaining international peace and security against the threat of aggression by any power or probable combination of powers.

3. The parties shall promote peace by refraining from any use or threat of force contrary to the principles of the U.N. Charter, and by exerting every influence against international use of force by any nation.

4. The parties shall contribute to peaceful development and change in other countries in accordance with the desires of such other countries, by refraining from: (a) indirect aggression and subversion against these countries; (b) providing military support to promote internal change by force of arms; and (c) otherwise interfering in the internal affairs of other countries.

5. The parties shall use existing machinery in and out of the U.N. for the peaceful settlement of disputes. They shall support within the United Nations studies and the development of additional international peace-keeping arrangements.

6. The parties shall accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice.

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N. Control Organization

1. An international control organization shall be established upon entry into force of the agreement with the powers needed to verify compliance with the obligations undertaken in Stage I. Its functions shall be expanded progressively as required for the verification of the implementation of these obligations. The control organization shall have an appropriate relationship to the United Nations which does not subject its operations to veto in the Security Council.

2. The control organization shall have an impartial director with authority, international staff, and finances adequate to assure effective impartial implementation of the functions of the organization.

3. The control organization shall also have a control commission consisting of representatives of parties to the treaty, including the representatives of all the Big Powers, the function of which shall be to give the director such guidance as may be necessary and to determine any issues which may arise in the interpretation and application of the treaty.

4. The International Court of Justice shall be available to the director or to the control commission for advisory opinions, and to a party in controversy with another, in regard to issues arising out of the application of the treaty and the operation of the control organization.

5. While Stage I is being implemented, the control organization shall study and approve the changes in personnel, equipment, and

finances and other measures which may be necessary to enable the control organization to carry out its functions under the next stage. The changes and measures shall be in effect before Stage II begins. During the progress of Stage I, the control organization shall also consider and propose to the parties any changes in its structure and organization which may be desirable to improve its operations for Stage II.

G. Transition from Stage I to Stage II

1. Transition from the first stage to the second stage should be initiated when the Security Council certifies that: (a) all agreed measures constituting the first stage have been fully implemented and their effective verification and inspection is continuing; and (b) the control organization is ready to begin verification of compliance with the agreed measures in the second stage.

STAGE II

This stage provides for further measures that will be taken when the procedure in G.1. above has been accomplished.

A. Measures to Further Reduce the Nuclear Threat

1. Further equitable transfers to non-weapons uses of fissionable materials from past production shall be made.

2. States shall accept an obligation not to be the first to use weapons of mass destruction.

3. Agreed arrangements to enforce a prohibition of the transfer of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons delivery vehicles between countries shall be instituted.

4. Additional agreed nuclear free zones shall be instituted.

B. Measures for Further Reduction of Strategic Delivery Vehicles

1. Further reductions in the inventories of strategic delivery vehicles shall be implemented in accordance with the procedure outlined in Stage I. The levels of reductions during Stage II would be related to the degree of improvement and increased confidence in the verification system, it being recognized that as low levels are achieved confidence in the effectiveness of the verification system must be greater than that acceptable for Stage I.

C. Measures for Further Reduction of Armed Forces and Other Armaments

1. Levels of forces for the U.S. and U.S.S.R. shall be further reduced, by agreed steps, to 1.7 million each (Alternative: to agreed levels); force levels of the other states limited in Stage I as well as of certain additional states shall also be reduced to agreed levels so as to assure a continued balanced program of reductions.

2. Major types of armaments by agreed categories shall be further reduced in accordance with the procedure outlined in Stage I.

3. Further limitations on armed forces and armaments in agreed areas may be negotiated with the agreement of the countries affected.

4. Additional air and ground inspection zones as may be agreed shall be established.

5. A Scientific Commission on CBR weapons shall be established under the control organization to design effective means for controlled limitation on CBR armaments and to recommend an effective system with reliable safeguards for CBR disarmament.

D. Machinery for Keeping the Peace and for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes

1. During Stage II the parties shall cooperate to develop further the peacekeeping machinery of the United Nations, to the end that during the development of Stage III the United Nations will effectively be able to deter or suppress any threat or use of force in violation of international obligations.

Therefore, during Stage II:

(a) An international peace force shall be established under a United Nations command responsible to the political organs of the United Nations.

(b) Nations would agree upon such necessary changes in the structure and operation of the United Nations to assure that the United Nations will be able to operate more effectively to protect nations against threats to or breaches of the peace.

(c) Nations would also agree upon further improvements and developments in rules of international conduct and in machinery for peaceful settlement of disputes and differences.

E. Control Organization

1. The powers and responsibilities of the control organization shall be progressively enlarged in order to give it the capabilities to verify the measures undertaken in Stage II.

F. Transition from Stage II to Stage III

1. Transition from the second stage to the third stage should be initiated when the Security Council certifies that: (a) all measures in the second stage have been fully implemented; (b) the control organ is ready to begin verification of appropriate measures in the third stage; and (c) the international machinery is effectively operating and continues to be capable of maintaining international peace and security under conditions of Stage III.

STAGE III

By the time Stage II has been completed, the confidence produced through a verified disarmament program and the development of strengthened international peacekeeping machinery should have reached a point where the nations of the world can move forward to a third stage in which progressive general disarmament would proceed to a point where no nation would have the military capability which could challenge the progressively strengthened international security forces. The progressive steps to be taken during the final phase of the disarmament program would be directed toward the attainment of a world in which:

(a) The forces, armaments, and military establishments of states would be reduced to those necessary for the purpose of maintaining internal order and providing agreed contingents of forces to assist the international peace force.

(b) Weapons capable of producing mass destruction or lethal mass casualties, and their means of delivery would be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses.

(c) The manufacture of armaments would be limited to those of agreed types and quantities, to be used for national security forces or by the international peace force.

(d) The peacekeeping capabilities of the United Nations would be sufficiently strong and the obligations of all nations under such arrangements sufficiently far-reaching as to assure peace and the just settlement of differences in a disarmed world.

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SUPPLEMENT TO
RECOMMENDED U. S. DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATING PROPOSAL

I. Introduction

1. This paper constitutes a supplement to the Recommended U. S. Disarmament Negotiating Proposal and is not intended for formal tabling in negotiations with the U.S.S.R. The approach and measures outlined herein do not lend themselves to formal discussion in the kind of disarmament negotiations that have traditionally been held since 1946, because much of what is suggested here is designed to induce modifications in military posture and practices that are not susceptible to formal agreement. Moreover, the U.S.S.R.'s traditional aversion to measures or approaches which it regards as "sneaky", together with its obvious intent to continue to pursue the sort of "radical" disarmament policy exemplified by its proposals for 600, makes it virtually certain that any proposals or formal bargaining of the type of "arms control" measures suggested below would be rejected out-of-hand by the Soviets. In fact, Soviet rejection of previous, informal approaches is only slightly less likely. Nevertheless, if there is any chance of beginning a dialogue with the U.S.S.R. on the matter mentioned in this supplement, it is through informal soundings essentially outside the normal framework of disarmament negotiations.

2. The manner in which the measures suggested herein should be taken up with the Soviet, should be flexible. Informal bilateral talks

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conferences with more formal disarmament discussions are one way, though perhaps not the best in view of past Soviet attitudes. An alternative worth looking at is to use the personnel now essentially inactive at the U.N. Military Staff Committee; other means may be the military attaches in Moscow and Washington or in some other capitals, or the military missions in contact in Germany.

II. Nature of Measures

1. The basic purpose of the various suggestions made is (1) to improve communication between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. and hence to reduce the risk of misinterpretations of military activities, (2) to reduce the danger that accidental or unpremeditated occurrences will lead to the unleashing of strategic strike forces, (3) to reduce the need for rapid response, especially in the face of ambiguous indicators, and (4) to reduce the incentive, temptation or compulsion to initiate general nuclear war.

2. Not all of the measures proposed are suitable for formal agreements requiring ratification by constitutional processes or even by Executive Agreements. This is so not only because there is virtually no chance that the Soviets would accept such agreements; it is due also to the fact that formal binding agreements may be undesirable even if obtainable. Many of the measures are keyed to transitory strategic situations, others may be experimental or tentative and still

others simply involve the development of more productive and frank verbal exchanges.

3. It goes without saying that the measures or actions suggested are not intended to be packaged; each, in and of itself, would have merit if implemented separately.

4. Finally, the approach outlined herein is thought to be responsive to the desire of both sides to avoid general nuclear war. Hence it should probably be pursued regardless of whether U.S.-Soviet relations are relatively tranquil or relatively turbulent; indeed, it has been suggested that it would be more urgent to pursue it in times of crisis to avoid escalation.

I. Suggested Measures, Approaches, or Actions

1. Information Exchange

The U.S. would make available to the Soviets at an early date and if a suitable opportunity presents itself a compendium of measures which the U.S. now is taking, or plans to take unilaterally to make its forces less accident-prone, more truly of second-strike character, and otherwise more stable. The document should be made available without a request for a similar document in return, though the inference that we would welcome one could be left. The document could indicate where the U.S. would be able to do more if certain reciprocal actions by the Soviets occurred but this should be done subtly in view of Soviet sensitivity to "deintelligence-gathering". To avoid difficulties

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with the Allies, the document should probably be made available to
SAC together with an indication that it has been given the Soviets.
It should not, however, be published so as not to compromise the
privacy of the channel. We would, of course, have no control over
Soviet publication perhaps even with a propaganda blast that it
proves U.S. opposition to disarmament. But this should not disturb us
since the main purpose is to get the Soviets to read it.

2. Parale Telephone

For a variety of reasons the establishment of rapid communication
between the President and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers,
U.S.S.R., is, on balance, desirable. Various ways of bringing this
about have been proposed, including a direct Kremlin-White House line,
a line between U.S. and Soviet command posts, and the use of communica-
tion satellites. The most practical means would appear to be a
unilateral U.S. telephone link between the Department of State and the
Embassy in Moscow similar to that now in existence between London and
the British Embassy in Moscow. Installation of such a line probably
requires approval of the Soviet authorities; if this is readily obtained
(there may be difficulty over whether scramblers could be used over
landlines through Soviet territory), the President could then notify
Khrushchev when the line is installed and indicate that it is available
should the need arise to clarify each other's intentions in times of
crisis or accident. If the Soviet authorities give trouble, the

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It might also be possible to ask Khrushchev's intervention and explain the advantages of the system.

g. Military Attaches

We might usefully suggest to the Soviets an increase in respective attaché staffs to open up an avenue for professional military contacts and possibly for use if either side wishes to reassure the other of its benign intent in the event of some accidental occurrence or if it became apparent that the side was misconstruing some particular action, (e.g. an exercise or alert). We might also consider using the Soviet personnel attached to the U.N. Military Staff Committee in this way, in which case it would be desirable to urge the Soviets to assign well-qualified personnel.

As a variant of the above suggestion, we could propose the establishment of emergency observation teams in each other's capitals for use in case either side feels the need to reassure the other.

h. Advance Notification of Missile Launchings

Although a proposal on this is included in our formal disarmament proposal, it may nevertheless be desirable, especially if the Soviets continue to reject it, to undertake a private effort to explain to the Soviets the advantage of such a program for reducing miscalculations or misplaced anxieties. We might suggest that if they are opposed to a formal agreement, we should begin the practice of advance notification (at least by effort to do the most part by us and in the case of the

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Soviet Pacific missiles shots by the Soviets) without saying that it was part of an agreement. It might be suggested to the Soviets that in time the MIDAS-type systems of both sides might be used to check on these advance notifications.

5. Advance Notification of Aircraft Flights in Certain Regions

We might broach the notion of private advance notification to each other of bomber flights in the Arctic Region above 60 or 65 degrees north latitude. National warning systems could detect violations of the understanding and also whether the arrangement makes any difference in terms of the responses made by the respective defenses to such flights.

6. Non-Aggression Pact in Space

The U.S. should begin a gradual campaign of seeking to impress on the Soviets the stabilizing nature of various types of satellite observation systems. Such a campaign might culminate in a tacit understanding not to interfere with each other's satellite systems. Such a "non-aggression pact" in space could be a concomitant to a formal agreement not to station vehicles capable of delivering mass destruction weapons in space. In connection with such a "pact" there might also be an arrangement for sharing the data gathered by various kinds of satellite systems, especially of the MIDAS type.

7. Exchange of Information on Communications and Strategic Indicators

The U.S. might broach the desirability of exchanging information and consulting in times of communications failures of various sorts.

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(Communications "standdowns" are sources of anxiety.) More delicately, and depending on Soviet receptivity to the general approach of this supplement, there might be an exchange about the sort of intelligence indicators that cause anxiety and some beginnings about modifying those practices.

8. Limitations on Space Launches

The U.S. could suggest to the Soviets that as both sides enter the period when they are capable of multiple space and missile shots on a given day, it would be prudent to limit such launches to a relatively small number, and to allow intervals between them. The purpose would be to prevent any concern on the other side that (1) an actual attack was in progress, (2) efforts are being made to degrade the other side's detection system preparatory to an attack, or (3) salvo firing was being practiced.

9. Limitations on Deployments of Strategic Missiles and Nuclear Weapons

When and if the U.S. decides not to deploy MRBM's on the ground in Europe or to withdraw IRBM's presently stationed in Europe, we might indicate to the Soviets that we are contemplating these actions, that we would have a much easier time implementing them if they refrained from deploying missiles capable of striking Western Europe, and that we cannot guarantee that we will always refrain from deploying strategic missiles to Western Europe unless we see that the Soviets do not threaten Western Europe with their missiles.

We might also indicate to the Soviets that we would consider pulling back tactical nuclear weapons in Europe for a certain distance if (1) we were reasonably certain they had none with their forces or those of their allies in Eastern Europe, and (2) they otherwise were in a visably defensive posture in East Germany.